# Truth Be Told

Workshop on Philosophical and Formal Theories of Truth

> 23–25 March 2011 University of Amsterdam

#### Dear participant,

Welcome to the *Truth Be Told* Workshop, which would not have been possible without the support of the following organisations:

- The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
- Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
- The Evert Willem Beth Foundation
- Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam
- VICI Research Budget of Prof. Dr. Rens Bod

Thanks are also due to the members of the programme committee who have been kind enough to referee the many excellent submissions received for this workshop.

#### The members are:

Theodora Achourioti, John Collins, Pascal Engel, Hartry Field, Volker Halbach, Wolfram Hinzen, Leon Horsten, Paul Horwich, Benedikt Löwe, Thomas Müller, Michael Sheard, Martin Stokhof, Michiel van Lambalgen, Albert Visser.

The rest of this booklet contains useful information for your time during the workshop.

We wish you an enjoyable workshop and stay in Amsterdam.

The organisers,

Theodora Achourioti & Peter van Ormondt Amsterdam, March 2011

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### Workshop Description

The extensive literature published on truth over the last decade has made it increasingly clear that philosophers and logicians working on theories of truth can no longer talk past each other. This workshop will serve as a meeting point for philosophers and logicians to exchange their ideas and discuss the latest results of work on truth. As a backdrop to these discussions the following questions are of particular interest:

- Does a philosopher of truth need to be aware of the results in the formal study of truth? Do logicians need to incorporate philosophical insights in order to constrain their theories of truth?
- Has the recent literature shed light on the opposition between deflationism and substantive theories of truth? How does deflationism, or any other current theory of truth, fare when compared to linguistic and cognitive data?
- Are the various solutions that have been proposed to the paradoxes isolated tricks to solve a particular problem, or can they fit under a wider framework?

Invited Speakers: John Collins, Pascal Engel, Hartry Field, Volker Halbach, Jaakko Hintikka, Wolfram Hinzen, Leon Horsten, Paul Horwich, Hannes Leitgeb, Michael Sheard and Albert Visser.

**Selected Speakers:** Cezary Cieslinski, Pablo Cobreros, Douglas Edwards, Paul Egré, Jose Martinez Fernandez, Dave Ripley, Robert Van Rooij and Stefan Wintein.

Commentators: Theodora Achourioti, Riccardo Bruni, Timothy Chan, Kentaro Fujimoto, Henri Galinon, Monika Gruber, David Liggins, Markus Pantsar, Ulrich Reichard, Jönne Speck, Giulia Terzian and Sean Walsh.

# Scientific Programme

### Wednesday

| 12.00-13.00       | Registration  |  |
|-------------------|---|--|
| 13.00-13.10       | Opening   |  |
| Afternoon Session | Chair: Michiel van Lambalgen  |  |
| 13.10-14.25       | Invited talk: Hannes Leitgeb  A Theory of Truth for Propositions  Commentator: Markus Pantsar           |  |
| 14.30-15.45       | Invited talk: Albert Visser Full Satisfaction Classes for Sequential Models Commentator: Volker Halbach |  |
| 15.45-16.00       | Break   |  |
| 16.00-17.15       | Invited talk: Volker Halbach  The Elusiveness of Disquotationalism  Commentator: Riccardo Bruni         |  |
| 17.20-18.00       | Contributed talk: Cezary Cieslinski T-Equivalences for Positive Sentences                               |  |
| Evening Session   | Chair: Theo Kuipers   |  |
| 20.00-21.30       | E.W. Beth lecture: Hartry Field Property Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics                      |  |

### Thursday

| Morning Session   | Chair: Frank Veltman   |
|-------------------|--|
| 9.30-10.45        | Invited talk: Jaakko Hintikka Who is afraid of Alfred Tarski? Commentator: Sean Walsh                                |
| 10.45-11.00       | Break  |
| 11.00-12.15       | Invited talk: Michael Sheard  Truth and Trustworthiness  Commentator: Theodora Achourioti                            |
| 12.20-13.00       | Contributed talk: Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré,<br>Dave Ripley, Robert van Rooij<br>Tolerant and Strict Truth           |
| 13.00-14.15       | Lunch Break  |
| Afternoon Session | Chair: Stephen Read  |
| 14.15-15.30       | Invited talk: Hartry Field  Naive Truth Theories  Commentator: Jönne Speck   |
| 15.35-16.15       | Contributed talk: Jose Martinez Fernandez<br>Remarks on the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point<br>Property for k-valued Clones |
| 16.15-16.30       | Break  |
| 16.30-18.00       | Invited talk: Leon Horsten Understanding the Revision Theory of Truth Commentators: Kentaro Fujimoto & Henri Galinon |

### Friday

| Morning Session   | Chair: Thomas Müller   |  |
|-------------------|--|--|
| 9.30-10.45        | Invited talk: Wolfram Hinzen  Deflationism, Truth, and Grammar  Commentator: Monika Gruber                                   |  |
| 10.45-11.00       | Break  |  |
| 11.00-12.15       | Invited talk: John Collins  Playing Old Harry with Truth (and Meaning)  Commentator: Ulrich Reichard                         |  |
| 12.20-13.00       | Contributed talk: Stefan Wintein From Closure Games to Generalized Strong Kleene Theories of Truth                           |  |
| 13.00-14.15       | Lunch Break  |  |
| Afternoon Session | Chair: Martin Stokhof  |  |
| 14.15-15.30       | Invited talk: Pascal Engel  Alethic Pluralism and the Norm of Truth  Commentator: Timothy Chan                               |  |
| 15.35-16.15       | Contributed talk: Douglas Edwards  Deflationism, Inflationism, Substantiveness,  Sparseness                                  |  |
| 16.15-16.30       | Break  |  |
| 16.30-18.00       | Invited talk: Paul Horwich  An Undermining Diagnosis of Relativism about Truth  Commentators: David Liggins & Giulia Terzian |  |

### **Abstracts**

#### The E.W. Beth Lecture

# Hartry Field (New York University) Property Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics

Gödel once said "There never were any set-theoretic paradoxes, but the property-theoretic paradoxes are still unresolved." I will explain this, indicate the intended distinction between sets and properties (which isn't just over extensionality), and review work since Gödel toward resolving the property-theoretic paradoxes. (In my view we now have a pretty good, though not completely satisfactory, solution to them, and there is a reasonable hope of improving it.) I will also discuss the role of properties in the foundations of mathematics, as a replacement of proper classes and to implement an appropriate version of higher order logic.

#### **Invited Talks**

# John Collins (University of East Anglia) Playing Old Harry with Truth (and Meaning)

The paper seeks to extend some thoughts from Austin on the occassion-sensitivity of truth in order to divorce truth from meaning, the latter concept being occasion-invariant. The paper will seek this overarching conclusion by way of recent arguments from Kennedy and Stanley that a semantic theory should deliver a 'sensible ontology'.

## Pascal Engel (University of Geneva) Alethic Pluralism and the Norm of Truth

Functionalism about truth, especially in the form of "alethic functionalism" defended by Lynch 2009, counts the norms of truth for belief (NT) as a truism, among others which functionnally define truth. I argue that Lynch cannot take it as a truism, since it has many conflicting interpretations and that the ambiguity between a conceptual reading and a property reading of the truism create difficulties for alethic functionalism.

## Hartry Field (New York University) Naive Truth Theories

The talk will be a nontechnical introduction to the program of giving a theory of truth on which  $\text{True}(\langle A \rangle)$  is equivalent to A, in a nonclassical logic to escape the paradoxes, with a mention of one currently unsolved problem for the program.

# Volker Halbach (University of Oxford) The Elusiveness of Disquotationalism

An axiomatization (or theory or 'implicit definition') of truth is called disquotational iff it can be given by a set of sentences of the form

A' is true iff A

and no further truth-theoretic sentences.

The discussion of the formal properties of disquotational theories has focused on axiomatizations where A is assumed not to contain the truth predicate. I'll argue that, while Tarski might have had good reasons for this restriction, the disquotationalist should look at more liberal versions. The resulting theories differ widely in their formal properties.

I'll look at the disquotational theory PUTB (Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge University Press, 2011, Chapter 19), which refutes the often held view that disquotational theories are deductively weak. PUTB is deductively as strong as the Kripke-Feferman theory.

I take a pessimistic view on disquotationalism: without a policy on the permissible instances it is a vacuous doctrine, but I don't think that a sensible policy has been found.

If time permits, I'll discuss the role of the T-sentences in Tarski's account and show why Tarski's use of the T-sentences contradicts his discussion of disquotational theories.

# Jaakko Hintikka (Boston University) Who is afraid of Alfred Tarski?

Tarski proved the indefinability of truth for a first-order (FO) language that uses traditional logic in the same language. Accordingly, his T-schema cannot be generalized into a truth-definition. The reason turns out to be circularity. The quantifiers in an attempted definiens would depend on the quantifiers characterizing the definiendum, and cannot be freed from this dependence by means of traditional logic. This flaw is corrected in independence-friendly (IF) logic, which therefore admits a missing truth predicate e.g. in the form of the existence of Skolem functions. The validity of this definition is equivalent to the axiom of choice, which is seen to be a FO logical principle. Truth is thus definable for a language in the same language if it is flexible enough to

express every kind of independence. Cases in point include IF FO languages and presumably our colloquial language.

# Wolfram Hinzen (Durham University) Deflationism, Truth, and Grammar

Recent deflationary theories of truth assume the existence of a truth-predicate in natural language whose meaning is given by a suggested equivalence between the attribution of truth to a proposition and an assertion of that proposition itself. I analyse the syntax of such equivalences and suggest that even where no truth predicate is overtly present on one of the two sides of such equivalences, there is a covert sentential predicate present in the underlying syntactic structure that has the semantics of the truth predicate. If so, the two sides come out as equivalent in terms of their compositional semantics. The account involves not only a unified analysis of truth attributions such as 'it's true that p' or 'that p is true', but also of such constructions as 'it seems that p' and 'it's that p'. All of these constructions are shown to align with copular constructions in general. This analysis vindicates deflationism insofar as it derives the basic intuition on which deflationism rests. But it also shows that the equivalences in question don't actually illuminate the nature of truth predication, which, although demonstrated here to be an inherently grammatical phenomenon, remains as mysterious as before.

# Leon Horsten (Bristol University) Understanding the Revision Theory of Truth

This is joint work with Hannes Leitgeb and Philip Welch.

This paper explores the ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and almost stable truth can be so expressed.

# Paul Horwich (New York University) An Undermining Diagnosis of Relativism about Truth

This paper argues for the following points:

- 1. Our actual concept of truth is absolute.
- 2. A deflationary account of it is correct.
- 3. This concept is valuable and unobjectionable.
- 4. So it should not be abandoned in favor of a relativistic concept.
- 5. Certain inflationary theories of absolute truth (in which 'truth' is identified with one or another form of 'determination') would be profitably replaced by affiliated theories of relative truth (explained as 'relative determination' or 'determination by such-and-such contextual factors').
- 6. But insofar as the initial theory does not successfully capture truth, the relativistic replacement won't really concern relative truth, properly so

called.

7. Granted, a form of 'relative determination' – in particular, 'conditions that determine sentence-acceptance' – may well prove to be explanatorily valuable in semantics. But nothing good could come of calling them "relative truth conditions".

# Hannes Leitgeb (LMU Munich) A Theory of Truth for Propositions

This is joint work with Philip Welch.

The paper will deal with the following question: Is it possible to formulate a theory of truth which solves or avoids semantic paradoxes in the same way as modern set theory solves or avoids the set-theoretic paradoxes? In order to answer this question, we first axiomatize a theory of propositions and propositional functions that form a cumulative hierarchy very much like the cumulative hierarchy of sets, and we then formulate an axiomatic theory of truth and satisfaction for such propositions and propositional functions that is very much like Tarski's theory of truth. Finally, we argue for the resulting package along the lines of standard arguments for modern set theory.

## Michael Sheard (Rhodes College) Truth and Trustworthiness

In the course of ordinary communication, people transmit messages (i.e., say things) which may involve the application of a truth predicate. The receiver of such a message needs to have a method which allows the extraction of non-truth-theoretic information from uses of the truth predicate; such a method can be modeled with an axiomatic system. On close examination, the choice of which axiomatic system to employ can be seen to depend on whether or not the source of the message is considered trustworthy – that is, whether the information in the message can simply be accepted, or if it must first be examined for consistency with previously known information and, on the basis of that determination, possibly be rejected. This talk will explore some of the consequences involved in this framework.

# Albert Visser (University of Utrecht) Full Satisfaction Classes for Sequential Models

This talk reports on results obtained in collaboration with Ali Enayat.

I present the basics of satisfaction classes and briefly indicate the various pitfalls and fallacies surrounding them. I briefly sketch some of the fundamental results in the area. Consider a sequential model M and a designated interpretation N of the natural numbers in that model. A satisfaction class S for Mis **full** iff S satisfies the Tarski conditions for all formulas (including the nonstandard ones) of the language of M according to (M, N). Our main result is as follows. Any sequential model M with natural numbers  $\mathbb{N}$  (satisfying a few conditions) has an elementary extension  $M^*$  with a full satisfaction class S. We can do a bit better by adding some natural extra conditions for S. I will discuss the main idea of the proof.

#### Contributed Talks

#### Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarra), Paul Egré (Institut Jean-Nicod), Dave Ripley (University of Melbourne), Robert van Rooij (ILLC) *Tolerant and Strict Truth*

We present and briefy consider a logical approach to transparent truth. We describe eight logics, four including a fully transparent truth predicate, and describe some relations between them. The strongest logic we consider is a strengthening of classical logic: all classically valid inferences are valid in our logic, and more besides. The additions result from full transparency for our truth predicate. This is achieved by relaxing transitivity; the logic is not unrestrictedly transitive. The main paper presents a single model theory for all eight logics, and considers the application of this strongest logic to the liar paradox. An appendix gives a single proof theory for all eight logics.

# Cezary Cieslinski (University of Warsaw) T-equivalences for positive sentences

Although disquotational truth theories are often criticized as unduly weak, in fact some of them turn out to be very rich in arithmetical content. Halbach's theory PUTB, based on positive substitutions of the uniform disquotation schema, belongs to this category. However, local (sentential) disquotation does not produce such a strong theory. Answering a question asked by Halbach (2009), I show that a disquotational truth theory, which takes as axioms all positive substitutions of the sentential truth schema, together with all instances of induction in the language with the truth predicate, is conservative over its syntactical base.

# Douglas Edwards (University College Dublin) Deflationism, Inflationism, Substantiveness, Sparseness

One way that 'deflationary' views of truth are typically taken to differ from 'inflationary' views is that deflationary views deny, and inflationary views assert, that truth is a 'substantive' property. In this paper I consider how useful this notion of substantiveness is as a method to distinguish deflationism from inflationism. In particular, I argue that the two main conceptions of what it is for properties to be 'substantive' or 'insubstantive' (those of Wright 2001 and Horwich 1998) fail to map onto the more general metaphysical distinction between abundant and sparse properties. Given that it seems as though considering truth as a sparse property best fits the inflationists' motivations for inflating, this suggests that the debate shoulfffd be refocused on the issue

of whether or not truth is a sparse property, as opposed to whether or not truth is a 'substantive' property.

# Jose Martinez Fernandez (University of Barcelona) Remarks on the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property for k-valued clones

The main objective of this paper is to prove that certain families of k-valued clones have the Gupta-Belnap fixed-point property. This, essentially, means that all propositional languages that are interpreted with operators belonging to those clones are such that any net of self-referential sentences can be consistently evaluated. The results will be applied to study some expansions of the four-valued clones due to Belnap and Fitting.

# Stefan Wintein (Tilburg University) From Closure Games to Generalized Strong Kleene theories of Truth

In this paper, we present the Method of Closure Games (MCG), which is a game theoretic framework to construct theories of truth. In particular, we will illustrate that — as a consequence of our first and second stable judgement theorem — MCG is a powerful tool to study three and four valued Strong Kleene theories of truth in a uniform manner. The uniform approach allows us to combine suitably related three and four valued Strong Kleene theories of truth into so called Generalized Strong Kleene theories of truth (GSK theories). We illustrate the notion of a GSK theory by means of V8+, an eight valued GSK theory which is defined in terms of one four valued and two three valued Strong Kleene theories.

### Social Programme

Three social events have been organised for the workshop delegates.

#### Reception: E.W. Beth Lecture

On Wednesday the  $23^{rd}$  of March Prof. Hartry Field will deliver the E.W. Beth-lecture. After this event there will be a reception.

| location: | De Doelenzaal, UB, Singel 425 (workshop venue) |
|-----------|--|
|           |  |
| time:     | 21.30 hrs                                      |

#### Workshop Reception

On Thursday the  $24^{th}$  of March, there will be a reception at *Kapitein Zeppos* (number 10 on the map on the final page), kindly offered by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam.

| location: | Kapitein Zeppos, Gebed Zonder End 5 |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|
|           |                                     |
| time:     | 18.15 hrs                           |

#### Conference Dinner

A conference dinner (buffet style) has been arranged for Friday the  $25^{th}$  of March at *Kapitein Zeppos*, private room 'La Folie' (number 10 on the map on the final page). All speakers, commentators and chairs are invited.

Other participants are very welcome to attend with a contribution of 20 euros. Please inform the organisers no later than Wednesday the  $23^{rd}$  if this is of interest to you.


| location: | Kapitein Zeppos, Gebed Zonder End 5 |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|
|           |                                     |
| time:     | 20.00 hrs                           |

### Venue Information

### Location & Public Transport

The location of the workshop venue is:

De Doelenzaal Universiteitsbibliotheek Singel 425 1012 WP Amsterdam



**UB:** Workshop Venue

**T1:** Tram Stop Spui Trams 4, 9, 16, 24, 25 **T2:** Tram Stop Spui Trams 1, 2, 5, 13, 17

**T3:** Tram Stop Muntplein Trams 4, 9, 16, 24, 25

#### Internet information

#### The short version

At the registration desk you have received a login with an SSID and a password. Use this to log on to the wireless network.

#### The long version

Try to connect to the network with the SSID which was given to you using the default options and the password.

- 1. If you are using Vista you may get an error message saying that the connection failed. If you are connecting to the network for the first time, tick the box marked 'save this network'. Close the error message and open a web browser; try to load a page. If this fails, wait 30 seconds and try again. The network should work now. The error message may persist each time you reboot and reconnect to the network; in that case, wait 30 seconds and the network should work.
- 2. If you are using on your laptop and you are having trouble connecting, go to the registration desk for a more detailed manual.
- 3. If you are using a Mac laptop, connecting using the default options should work; you may have wait 30 seconds after connecting before the network works. If not, try the 'WEP 40/128 bit hex' security option.
- 4. On Linux, use the default WEP options or something resembling 'WEP 40/128 bit kev'.

#### Suggestions for Lunch

A small list with suggestions for lunch close to the workshop venue is provided below. You can find these places with the help of the map provided on the final page of the workshop booklet. Please note that lunch is not a culinary affair in The Netherlands. Many people make do with a cold sandwich.

#### UB Workshop Venue.

1. Mensa **Restaurant "Atrium"**Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237
Typical Dutch student mensa offering sandwiches and a few warm dishes.

2. Café De Jaren

Nieuwe Doelenstraat 20 Large 'grand café Serves everything from breakfast till dinner.

#### 3. La Place

Kalverstraat 203 Large self-service and take-away restaurant of the department store V&D. Sandwiches and warm meals.

#### 4. Caffè Panini

Vijzelgracht 3–5

Very nice italian restaurant for lunch, dinner and coffee.

#### 5. Blue

Singel 457 (Shopping center Kalvertoren  $3^{rd}$  floor) Lunch place with very nice view of the city.

6. Luxembourg

Spui 24 Authentic Grand-Café.

#### 7. Replay Café

Singel 461 Conveniently located near the conference site.

#### 8. Katoen

Oude Turfmarkt 153 Nearby student café with good coffee.

#### Suggestions for Dinner

The following website provides suggestions for dinner and reviews:

http://www.iens.nl/english/restaurantsIn/Amsterdam/

A small list with suggestions for dinner is also provided below. If you want to stay close to the conference site, most of the places listed for lunch also serve dinner.

Dinner in The Netherlands is usually served around 6:00 pm - 8:00 pm; many restaurants may not serve meals after 9:00 pm. Please keep in mind that eating out in Amsterdam is relatively expensive. You can find the places listed below with the help of the map provided on the final page of the workshop booklet.

- 9. **Kantjil en de Tijger** (Indonesian) Spuistraat 291-293, Phone (020) 620 09 94, kitchen open 12.00pm till 23.00pm.
- 10. **Kapitein Zeppos** (Lunch & Dinner) Gebed Zonder End 5, kitchen open from 12.00 till 22.30 pm
- 11. **Krua Thai Classic** (Thai), Staal-straat 22, Phone (020) 622 95 33.
- 12. **Koh-I-Noor** (Indian), Rokin 18, Phone (020) 627 21 18, kitchen open 5.00pm-11.30pm.


- 13. **Brasserie Harkema** (French brasserie style), Nes 67, phone (020) 428 2222, kitchen open 12.00–16.00 & 17.30–23.00.
- 14. **Restaurant Bridges** (Fancy French Cuisine), Oudezijds Voorburgwal 197, Phone (020) 5553 560, kitchen open 18.00–23.00.
- 15. **In de Waag** (Monumental building), Nieuwmarkt, Phone (020) 4227772, kitchen open 17.00–22.30.
- 16. **Oriental City** (Chinese), Oudezijds Voorburgwal 177-179, Phone (020) 626 8352, kitchen open 11.30–23.00.

# List of Participants

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