

Substructural PDL

Igor Sedlár*

The Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Computer Science
sedlar@cs.cas.cz

Propositional Dynamic Logic *PDL*, introduced in [6] following the ideas of [11], is a modal logic with applications in formal verification of programs [7], dynamic epistemic logic [1] and deontic logic [10], for example. More generally, *PDL* can be seen as a logic for reasoning about *structured actions* modifying various types of objects; examples of such actions include programs modifying states of the computer, information state updates or actions of agents changing the world around them.

In this contribution we study versions of *PDL* where the underlying propositional logic is a weak substructural logic in the vicinity of the full distributive non-associative Lambek calculus with a weak negation. The motivation is to provide a logic for reasoning about structured actions that modify *situations* in the sense of [2]; the link being the informal interpretation of the Routley–Meyer semantics for substructural logics in terms of situations [9].

In a recent paper [14] we studied versions of *PDL* based on Kripke frames with a ternary accessibility relation (in the style of [4, 8]). These frames do not contain the inclusion ordering essential for modelling situations, nor the compatibility relation articulating the semantics for a wide range of weak negations [5, 12]. Hence, in this contribution we study *PDL* based on (partially ordered) Routley–Meyer models with a compatibility relation.

Formulas φ and actions A are defined by mutual induction in the usual way [7]

$$\begin{aligned} A &:= a \mid A \cup A \mid A; A \mid A^* \mid \varphi? \\ \varphi &:= p \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \sim\varphi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \mid \varphi \circ \varphi \mid [A]\varphi \end{aligned}$$

where p is an atomic formula and a an atomic action. So far, we have results for the language without existential modalities $\langle A \rangle$ dual to $[A]$; inclusion of these is the focus of ongoing work. The implication $\rightarrow$ is the left residual of fusion $\circ$ which is assumed to be commutative for the sake of simplicity.

A Routley–Meyer frame is $\mathfrak{F} = \langle S, \leq, L, C, R \rangle$ where $(S, \leq, L)$ is a partially ordered set with an upwards-closed $L \subseteq S$; C is a symmetric binary relation antitone in both positions, that is

- Cxy , $x' \leq x$ and $y' \leq y$ only if $Cx'y'$;

and R is a ternary relation antitone in the first two positions such that

- $Rxyz$ only if $Ryxz$ and
- $x \leq y$ iff there is $z \in L$ such that $Rzxy$.

A (dynamic) Routley–Meyer model based on $\mathfrak{F}$ is $\mathfrak{M} = \langle \mathfrak{F}, \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket \rangle$ where

- $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ is a subset of S such that $\llbracket p \rrbracket$ is upwards-closed and
- $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ is a binary relation on S such that $\llbracket a \rrbracket$ is antitone in the first position.

It is assumed that $\llbracket \varphi \wedge \psi \rrbracket$ ($\llbracket \varphi \vee \psi \rrbracket$) is the intersection (union) of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket$ and

*This contribution is based on joint work with Vít Punčochář and Andrew Tedder.

- $\llbracket \sim \varphi \rrbracket = \{x \mid \forall y (Cxy \Rightarrow y \notin \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket)\},$
- $\llbracket \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket = \{x \mid \forall yz ((Rxyz \ \& \ y \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket) \Rightarrow z \in \llbracket \psi \rrbracket)\},$
- $\llbracket \varphi \circ \psi \rrbracket = \{x \mid \exists yz (Ryzx \ \& \ y \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \ \& \ z \in \llbracket \psi \rrbracket)\}$ and
- $\llbracket [A]\varphi \rrbracket = \{x \mid \forall y (x[A]y \Rightarrow y \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket)\}.$

It is also assumed that $\llbracket A \cup B \rrbracket$ ($\llbracket A; B \rrbracket$) is the union (composition) of $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket B \rrbracket$, that $\llbracket A^* \rrbracket$ is the reflexive-transitive closure of $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ and that

- $\llbracket \varphi? \rrbracket = \{\langle x, y \rangle \mid x \leq y \ \& \ y \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket\}$

We say that φ is valid in $\mathfrak{M}$ iff $L \subseteq \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$; a finite Γ entails φ in $\mathfrak{M}$ iff $\llbracket \bigwedge \Gamma \rrbracket \subseteq \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. Validity and entailment in a class of frames are defined as usual.

It can be shown that each $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ is antitone in its first position. This, together with the other tonicity conditions, entails that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ is an upwards-closed set for all φ (this is the motivation of the unusual definition of $\llbracket \varphi? \rrbracket$) and so we have in turn the consequence that Γ entails φ in $\mathfrak{M}$ iff $\bigwedge \Gamma \rightarrow \varphi$ is valid in $\mathfrak{M}$ (unlike the semantics without L and $\leq$ where both directions of the equivalence may fail).

Extending the results of [13], we prove completeness and decidability of the set of formulas valid in all frames using filtration in the style of [3].

A *logic* is any set of formulas Λ containing all formulas of the form $(\Leftrightarrow$ indicates that both implications are in Λ)

- | | |
|--|---|
| • $\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ | • $[A; B]\varphi \Leftrightarrow [A][B]\varphi$ |
| • $\varphi \wedge \psi \rightarrow \varphi$ and $\varphi \wedge \psi \rightarrow \psi$ | • $[A^*]\varphi \Leftrightarrow (\varphi \wedge [A][A^*]\varphi)$ |
| • $\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \psi$ and $\psi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \psi$ | • $[\varphi?]\varphi$ |
| • $\varphi \wedge (\psi \vee \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \wedge \psi) \vee (\varphi \wedge \chi)$ | • $\psi \rightarrow [\varphi?]\psi$ |
| • $[A]\varphi \wedge [A]\psi \rightarrow [A](\varphi \wedge \psi)$ | • $(\varphi \wedge [\varphi?]\psi) \rightarrow \psi$ |
| • $[A \cup B]\varphi \Leftrightarrow ([A]\varphi \wedge [B]\varphi)$ | |

and closed under the inference rules ($'//'$ indicates a two-way rule):

- | | |
|--|--|
| • $\varphi, \varphi \rightarrow \psi / \psi$ | • $\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi) // (\psi \circ \varphi) \rightarrow \chi$ |
| • $\varphi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi / \varphi \rightarrow \chi$ | • $\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi) // \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi)$ |
| • $\chi \rightarrow \varphi, \chi \rightarrow \psi / \chi \rightarrow (\varphi \wedge \psi)$ | • $\varphi \rightarrow \sim \psi // \psi \rightarrow \sim \varphi$ |
| • $\varphi \rightarrow \chi, \psi \rightarrow \chi / (\varphi \vee \psi) \rightarrow \chi$ | • $\varphi \rightarrow [A]\varphi / \varphi \rightarrow [A^*]\varphi$ |
| • $\varphi \rightarrow \psi / [A]\varphi \rightarrow [A]\psi$ | |

We write $\Gamma \vdash_{\Lambda} \Delta$ iff there are finite Γ', Δ' such that $\bigwedge \Gamma' \rightarrow \bigvee \Delta'$ is in Λ (hence, the relation $\vdash_{\Lambda}$ is finitary by definition). A prime Λ -theory is a set of formulas Γ such that $\varphi, \psi \in \Gamma$ only if $\Gamma \vdash_{\Lambda} \varphi \wedge \psi$ and $\Gamma \vdash_{\Lambda} \varphi \vee \psi$ only if $\varphi \in \Gamma$ or $\psi \in \Gamma$. For each $\Gamma \not\vdash_{\Lambda} \Delta$ there is a prime theory containing Γ but disjoint from Δ [12, 94]. The *canonical* Λ -frame the frame-type structure $\mathfrak{F}^{\Lambda}$ where S^{Λ} is the set of prime Λ -theories, $\leq^{\Lambda}$ is set inclusion, L^{Λ} is the set of prime theories containing Λ and

- $C^\Lambda \Gamma \Delta$ iff $\sim \varphi \in \Gamma$ only if $\varphi \notin \Delta$
- $R^\Lambda \Gamma \Delta \Sigma$ iff $\varphi \in \Gamma$ and $\psi \in \Delta$ only if $\varphi \circ \psi \in \Sigma$

It is a standard observation that $\mathfrak{F}^\Lambda$ is a Routley–Meyer frame for all Λ [12]. The *canonical* Λ -structure $\mathfrak{S}^\Lambda$ is the canonical frame with $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket^\Lambda$ defined as follows: $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\Lambda = \{\Gamma \in S^\Lambda \mid \varphi \in \Gamma\}$ and $\llbracket A \rrbracket^\Lambda = \{\langle \Gamma, \Delta \rangle \mid \forall \varphi ([A]\varphi \in \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi \in \Delta)\}$. It can be shown that $\mathfrak{S}^\Lambda$ is not a dynamic Routley–Meyer model (since $\{[a^n]p \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \not\vdash_\Lambda [a^*]p$, we may show that $\llbracket a^* \rrbracket^\Lambda$ is not the reflexive-transitive closure of $\llbracket a \rrbracket^\Lambda$).

Fix a finite set of formulas Φ that is closed under subformulas and satisfies the following conditions: i) $[\varphi?]\psi \in \Phi$ only if $\varphi \in \Phi$, ii) $[A \cup B]\varphi \in \Phi$ only if $[A]\varphi, [B]\varphi \in \Phi$, iii) $[A; B]\varphi \in \Phi$ only if $[A][B]\varphi \in \Phi$ and iv) $[A^*]\varphi \in \Phi$ only if $[A][A^*]\varphi \in \Phi$. We define $\Gamma \preceq_\Phi \Delta$ as $(\Gamma \cap \Phi) \subseteq \Delta$. This relation is obviously a preorder; let $\equiv_\Phi$ be the associated equivalence relation and let $[\Gamma]_\Phi$ be the equivalence class of Γ with respect to this relation.

The Φ -filtration of $\mathfrak{S}^\Lambda$ is the model-type structure $\mathfrak{M}_\Phi^\Lambda$ such that S_Φ is the (finite) set of equivalence classes $[\Gamma]$ for $\Gamma \in S^\Lambda$, $[\Gamma] \leq_\Phi [\Delta]$ iff $\Gamma \preceq_\Phi \Delta$ and

- $L_\Phi = \{[\Gamma] \mid \exists \Delta \in S^\Lambda (\Delta \preceq_\Phi \Gamma \text{ \& } \Delta \in L^\Lambda)\}$
- $C_\Phi = \{\langle [\Gamma_1], [\Gamma_2] \rangle \mid \exists \Delta_1, \Delta_2 (\Gamma_1 \preceq_\Phi \Delta_1 \text{ \& } \Gamma_2 \preceq_\Phi \Delta_2 \text{ \& } C^\Lambda \Delta_1 \Delta_2)\}$
- $R_\Phi = \{\langle [\Gamma_1], [\Gamma_2], [\Gamma_3] \rangle \mid \exists \Delta_1, \Delta_2, (\Gamma_1 \preceq_\Phi \Delta_1 \text{ \& } \Gamma_2 \preceq_\Phi \Delta_2 \text{ \& } R^\Lambda \Delta_1 \Delta_2 \Gamma_3)\}$
- $\llbracket p \rrbracket_\Phi = \{[\Gamma] \mid p \in \Gamma\}$ for $p \in \Phi$ and $\llbracket p \rrbracket_\Phi = \emptyset$ otherwise
- $\llbracket a \rrbracket_\Phi = \{\langle [\Gamma_1], [\Gamma_2] \rangle \mid \exists \Delta (\Gamma_1 \preceq_\Phi \Delta \text{ \& } \Delta \llbracket a \rrbracket^\Lambda \Gamma_2)\}$ if $[a]\chi \in \Phi$; $\llbracket a \rrbracket_\Phi = \emptyset$ otherwise.

The values of $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_\Phi$ on complex formulas and actions are defined exactly as in dynamic Routley–Meyer models. It can be shown that $\mathfrak{M}_\Phi^\Lambda$ is a dynamic Routley–Meyer model such that if $\varphi \in (\Phi \setminus \Lambda)$, then φ is not valid in $\mathfrak{M}_\Phi^\Lambda$. This implies completeness of the minimal logic Λ_0 with respect to (the set of formulas valid in) all Routley–Meyer frames.

In general, assume that we have $\mathbf{Log}(\mathbf{F})$, the set of formulas valid in all Routley–Meyer frames $\mathfrak{F} \in \mathbf{F}$. If $\mathcal{F}_\Phi^\Lambda \in \mathbf{F}$ for all Φ , then Λ is complete with respect to $\mathbf{F}$ (for instance, this is the case where $\mathbf{F}$ is the class of frames satisfying $Rxxx$ for all x). If $\mathcal{F}_\Phi^\Lambda \notin \mathbf{F}$, then one has to either modify the requirements concerning Φ (while keeping it finite; our argument showing that if $\varphi \in (\Phi \setminus \Lambda)$, then φ is not valid in $\mathfrak{M}_\Phi^\Lambda$ does not work if Φ is infinite) or devise an alternative definition of R_Φ and C_Φ . Such modifications for specific classes of frames (e.g. associative ones) is the focus of ongoing work.

A topic for future work is a modification of our argument not requiring that Φ be finite. An argument based on finite filtration does not go through in case of logics that are known not to have the finite model property, such as the relevant logic R for instance.

References

- [1] A. Baltag and L. S. Moss. Logics for epistemic programs. *Synthese*, 139(2):165–224, Mar 2004.
- [2] J. Barwise and J. Perry. *Situations and Attitudes*. MIT Press, 1983.
- [3] M. Bílková, O. Majer, and M. Peliš. Epistemic logics for sceptical agents. *Journal of Logic and Computation*, 26(6):1815–1841, 2016.
- [4] K. Došen. A brief survey of frames for the Lambek calculus. *Mathematical Logic Quarterly*, 38(1):179–187, 1992.

- [5] J. M. Dunn. A comparative study of various model-theoretic treatments of negation: A history of formal negation. In D. M. Gabbay and H. Wansing, editors, *What is Negation?*, pages 23–51. Springer, 1999.
- [6] M. J. Fischer and R. E. Ladner. Propositional dynamic logic of regular programs. *Journal of Computer and System Sciences*, 18:194–211, 1979.
- [7] D. Harel, D. Kozen, and J. Tiuryn. *Dynamic Logic*. MIT Press, 2000.
- [8] N. Kurtonina. *Frames and Labels. A Modal Analysis of Categorical Inference*. PhD Thesis, Utrecht University, 1994.
- [9] E. D. Mares. *Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
- [10] J.-J. C. Meyer. A different approach to deontic logic: deontic logic viewed as a variant of dynamic logic. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 29(1):109–136, 12 1987.
- [11] V. Pratt. Semantical considerations on Floyd-Hoare logic. In *7th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 109–121. IEEE Computing Society, 1976.
- [12] G. Restall. *An Introduction to Substructural Logics*. Routledge, London, 2000.
- [13] I. Sedlár. Substructural logics with a reflexive transitive closure modality. In J. Kennedy and R. de Queiroz, editors, *Logic, Language, Information, and Computation (Proceedings of the 24th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation – WoLLIC 2017)*, LNCS 10388, pages 349–357, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2017. Springer.
- [14] I. Sedlár and V. Punčochář. From positive PDL to its non-classical extensions. Under review, 2018.